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VARIANCE IN CALIFORNIA'S GENERAL
ASSISTANCE WELFARE RATES:
A DILEMMA AND A SOLUTION
INTRODUCTION

In Siskiyou County, a family of two or more persons in the
General Assistance welfare category receives an average welfare
allotment of five dollars per Month.1 In Tulare County, however, a similar family of two or more persons receives an average of one hundred eighty-eight dollars and thirty-three cents per
month.2 In California's fifty-six other counties, the General Asgistance rates range between these two extremes with an overall
average of about eighty-three dollars per month for a family of
two or more. 3 Since the board of supervisors of each county is
vested with the discretionary authority to set the level of support for
their respective counties,4 some variation should be expected.
However, when some counties pay their indigents thirty and forty
times as much welfare as others," the obvious conclusion is that
some counties are satisfying their statutory duty of support 6
while other counties are falling far short of fulfilling their obligation.
This comment analyzes the degree of discretion granted to
the counties under the current law along with the attendant merits and drawbacks of such discretion, and proposes alternative
solutions to the inequities inherent in the present statutory scheme.
WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA

There are essentially two basic types of welfare programs
currently operating in California. The most common welfare programs are the jointly funded state and federal programs designed
1.

CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

PUBLIC WELFARE

IN CALIFORNIA, JUNE 1972, Table 10a. This report was provided through the
courtesy of Fredrick B. Gillette, Director, Santa Clara County Department of
Social Services.

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 17001 (West 1972); see Patten v.
County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217 (1951); County of
Los Angeles v. Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d 455, 260 P.2d 41
(1953); Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279
(1971); Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971); Burns
v. Gillette, No. 275048, Santa Clara County Superior Court, July 7, 1972.
5. PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA, JUNE 1972, supra note 1, Table 10a.
6.

CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §

17000 (West 1972).
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to provide for individuals and families who have specific disabilities or needs. 7 The other type of welfare program is classified
as General Assistance, under which all indigents not eligible
for any of the jointly funded programs

through county funds. 8

are supported solely

The Jointly FundedFederaland State Programs

All fifty states, along with the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, participate in one or more
of the jointly funded categorical aid programs.9 The term "categorical aid" covers the entire field of jointly funded programs designed to provide for indigents with particular disabilities or

needs. 10

These jointly funded programs consist of four primary

categories:

(1) Aid to Families with Dependent Children;"
(2) Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled;
(3) Old Age Assistance;'
(4) Aid to the Blind.' 4

2

7. Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 774 n.1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61, 62
n.1 (1971); see generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06, 601-44, 1201-06, 1351-55 (1970);
see also Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8. Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 774 n.1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61, 62 n.1
(1971).
9.

UNITED

STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE,

92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,

SOCIAL SECURITY AND WELFARE REFORM, SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF H.R. 1 AS DETERMINED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, (Comm.

Print, June 13, 1972).
10. Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 774 n.1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61, 62 n.1

(1971).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 11200507 (West 1972); see also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE 99 11000-138 (West
1972). The Aid to Families with Dependent Children category (also known as
AFDC) includes families with one or more dependent children who have been
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence

from the home, physical or mental incapacity of a parent, or in some states by
reason of the unemployment of the father. 42 U.S.C. §§ 606, 607 (1970); CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 11250 (West 1972).
12. 42 U.S.C. 9H 1351-55 (1970); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE 99 13500801 (West 1972); see also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 11000-183 (West
1972). The Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled category includes
individuals over eighteen years of age who are permanently and totally dis-

abled, except for individuals who are inmates in non-medical public institu-

tions, and individuals who are patients in an institution for mental disease or
tuberculosis. 42 U.S.C. § 1355 (1970); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 13550-

556 (West 1972).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 301-06 (1970); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE 99 12000251 (West 1972); see also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 11000-183 (West
1972). The Old Age Assistance category includes individuals sixty-five years of
age or older who are considered needy, except for those .who are inmates in
non-medical public institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 306 (1970); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS.
CODE 99 12050, 12057.
14. 42 U.S.C. 99 1201-06 (1970); California has divided this category into
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Of the 2,096,877 welfare recipients in California, 5 approximently 97.42% are enrolled in one of the jointly funded categorical
aid programs,' 6 in the following proportions:
Table

117

72.56%
-Aid to Families with Dependent Children -------------------- 9.48%
Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
-14.71%
..------.......................-- -----------Old Age Assistance ------------.00.67%
............
Aid to the Blind -----------------------------------.-.-.--------.-.-....
-

The remaining 2.58% of the welfare recipients, approximately 54,000 persons, receive assistance solely through the General Assistance programs conducted by the individual counties.' 8
GeneralAssistance'9
The General Assistance programs in California are required
by Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 and are found
in every California county."0 Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 provides as follows:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and
support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident
therein when such persons are not supported and relieved
means, or by state
by their relatives or friends, by their own
2
hospitals or state or private institutions. '
This statute makes it the duty of every county to supports its indigents regardless of monetary deficiencies in the county's welfare budget.22 Thus, in the depression era case of Los Angeles
County v. Payne21 the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
was faced with the problem of insufficient funds to support county
indigents. 24 To alleviate the situation the board passed an emertwo sub-categories: Aid to the Blind, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE §§ 12500850 (West 1972), and Aid to the Potentially Self-Supporting Blind, CAL. WELF.
& INST'NS CODE §§ 13000-102 (West 1972); see also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE
§§ 11000-183 (West 1972). The Aid to the Blind category includes persons
who are blind and in need of assistance, except for those who are inmates in
non-medical public institutions, and persons who are patients in an institution
for mental disease or tuberculosis. 42 U.S.C. § 1206 (1970); CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS. CODE § 12014, 12550-562, 13050-57 (West 1972).
15. PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA, JUNE 1972, supra note 1, table 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; the actual figure in June of 1972 was 53,990.
19. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE §§ 17000-409 (West 1972).
20. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 17000 (West 1972).
21. Id.
22. Los Angeles County v. Payne, 8 Cal. 2d 563, 66 P.2d 658 (1937).
23. 8 Cal. 2d 563, 66 P.2d 658 (1937).
24. Id. at 567, 66 P.2d at 659-660.
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gency resolution adding $1,000,000 to the welfare budget for the
continued support of the county's poor.25 Both the County Treasurer and the County Auditor refused to implement the resolution
on the grounds that the appropriation exceeded the board's authority.2 6 The County filed suit requesting that a writ of mandate be issued to compel the county treasurer and auditor to
honor the appropriation. 7 The California Supreme Court granted
the requested relief, holding that the county's statutory duty to
support its resident indigents must be complied with.2 8
Similarly, in San Francisco v. Collins,29 another depression
era case, the San Francisco City and County Board of Supervisors
attempted to a place on the ballot a bond issue, which, if passed,
would have provided the county with the funds necessary for the
support of its indigents.3 0 The registrar of voters, however, refused to place the bond issue on the ballot, contending among
other things, that the board lacked authority to issue that type of
bond.31 The California Supreme Court disagreed, and issued a
writ of mandate compelling the registrar to place the issue on the
ballot. 2 The court held that a county's duty to support its indigents was mandatory, and that therefore the county would be allowed to raise in any appropriate manner the funds necessary
for the fulfillment of that duty.
Although the court did not
specifically address the issue of whether a county might be evading its statutory duty of support by leaving the authorization of
welfare funds up to the voters, the language used by the court in its
treatment of the bond issue indicated that even if the issue were
defeated, the county would still be required to
raise welfare funds
34
in order to satisfy its statutory duty of support.
Another California Supreme Court case which stressed the
mandatory duty of the counties to support their indigents was
Mooney v. Pickett.3
In that case the petitioner had been unem25. Id. at 565-567, 66 P.2d at 659-660.
26. Id. at 567, 66 P.2d at 660.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 573, 66 P.2d at 663.
29. 216 Cal. 187, 13 P.2d 912 (1932).
30. Id. at 189, 13 P.2d at 912-913.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 194, 13 P.2d at 915.
33. Id. at 190, 13 P.2d at 913.
34. The following language gives rise to this implication: "There can be
no question as to the applicability of the statute (§ 17000) . . . imposing a duty
on the county. . . . If then, a county or city and county must support its poor,
how may it raise the funds with which to do so? Section 4041.16 of the
Political Code . . . permits the levy of taxes by a county for this purpose, but
does not purport to restrict it to this means." Id. at 190, 13 P.2d at 913.
35. 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
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ployed for a considerable length of time. 86 When his unemployment benefits were finally exhausted, he sought the aid of the
San Mateo County welfare department. 37 He was denied General Assistance on the grounds that he was an "employable" person and therefore not eligible for General Assistance under San
Mateo County's "employability rule".8 8 The petitioner then
brought a class action on behalf of himself and all other persons
deemed "employable" who were otherwise eligible for General
Assistance in San Mateo County."9 Once again, the California Supreme Court issued a writ of mandate, this time forbidding San
Mateo County to deny petitioner or members of his class General

Assistance on the grounds of their employability.40 The court held

that the language of section 17000 required the county to support
all indigent persons not otherwise supported, and that this duty of

support was mandatory, 4 ' citing San Francisco v. Collins as sup42
port for this conclusion.
Along with its duty of support, every county is vested with
the general powers necessary for the administration of its General

36. The petitioner had lost his job in December of 1969. Thereafter, he
had found only temporary employment up until the time the suit was filed in
July of 1970. Id. at 673-74, 483 P.2d at 1233, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
37. Id. at 673, 483 P.2d, at 1233, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82.
38. Id.; San Mateo County Ordinance Code § 2339 provided that "Employable persons who do not come within the definition of persons eligible for
indigent aid . . . are not eligible for indigent aid; except in those cases in which
there is illness in the family or where the welfare of the children is threatened,
emergency aid may be given for temporary periods with the approval of the Superintendent of Social Services or the Director of Public Health and Welfare."
Similarly, General Assistance regulation GA-08 provided that "Generally speaking, employable persons are not eligible for General Assistance. However, in
those cases where the welfare of the children is threatened or where there is
illness in the family, emergency aid may be given with the approval of the
Superintendent of the Social Services division. Assistance will be granted to
employable adults only in emergencies. Such applicants will be required to register with the California State Employment Service as a condition of receiving
aid."
39. Id. at 674, 483 P.2d at 1234, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
40. Id. at 675-79, 483 P.2d at 1234-39, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 283-85.
41. Id. at 677-78, 483 P.2d at 1235-36, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 284-85.
42. Los Angeles County v. Payne, San Francisco v. Collins, and Mooney v.
Pickett all dealt with varying aspects of a county's mandatory duty to support
its indigents. In Los Angeles County v. Payne the court was concerned with the
board's authority to appropriate funds for this purpose, while San Francisco v.
Collins dealt with the manner in which these funds might be raised. Subsequently, in Mooney v. Pickett the court was faced with the question of how
far the county's duty of support extended. In each case, however, the court
stressed the mandatory duty of the county to support its indigents, and the
respective decisions turned on that issue. See Los Angeles County v. Payne,
8 Cal. 2d 563, 6 P.2d 658 (1937); San Francisco v. Collins, 216 Cal. 187, 13
P.2d 912 (1932); and Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94
Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
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Assistance program.43 These administrative powers are either express or implied, and can be very broad." For example the
power of the county to "supervise" the indigent, and to devise

ways and means to bring the indigent to a level of self-support
is a very broad and vague delegation of authority which would permit any reasonable method of accomplishing this goal."

The

nature of this supervisory power was explained in the recent case
of Adkins v. Leach." In that case the plaintiff brought a suit
against the Monterey County Board of Supervisors claiming that
he was unreasonably deprived of General Assistance relief.4 7 The
plaintiff had recently arrived with his family from Kansas and ap48
parently intended to establish residence in Monterey County.

His family was without funds or a place to live and they had only
a limited supply of food.4 9 Adkins went to the Monterey County
welfare department and applied for General Assistance and Aid to
Families with Dependent Children. 0 His application for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children was taken under submission
while his application for General Assistance was immediately de-

nied on the grounds that he did not have a county address." In
order to become eligible for General Assistance, plaintiff then
tried without success to find a landlord who would allow his

family to move in without paying rent or a deposit. 2 The
plaintiff tried again to obtain General Assistance by explaining his
dilemma but his application was denied.58 Thus Adkins, be43. The express powers enumerated in CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE (West
1972) are set forth in the following sections: the power to establish almhouses
and county farms, § 17002; the power to investigate all applications for relief,
and to supervise the indigent through periodic home visits in order to devise
ways and means to promote the indigent to a status of self support, § 17006;
the power to require residency within the county, §H 17003, 17100-17105;
the power to require the indigent to apply his personal property (within certain proscribed limits) toward his own support, H9 17107, 17111; the power
to require the indigent to transfer his property to the county for proper management while he is receiving aid, H9 17109, 17409; the power to require the indigent to work as a condition of relief, H§ 17200-17201; the power to require
the responsible relatives of the indigent to contribute towards his support, §
17300; with a court order if necessary, § 17311; the power to require the indigent to execute a lien to the county on all his real property for the amount of
aid rendered, § 17400-17401, 17404-17408; and the power to set standards of
aid and care for the relief of the indigent, § 17001.
44. See CAL. GovT. CODE § 23003 (West 1968).
45. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 17006 (West 1972).
46. 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
47. Id. at 773-75, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 62-63.
48. Id. at 773, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 773-74, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
52. Id. at 774, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
53. Id.
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cause of his status as a newly arrived indigent, was left in a precarious situation: he was not eligible for General Assistance until
he could obtain an address, and he could not obtain an address
until he received General Assistance. 4 To rectify the situation,
the plaintiff brought suit in Monterey County Superior Court seeking mandatory and injunctive relief55 on the basis that the requirement of an address was an unreasonable condition of welfare eligibility.5" According to Adkins' contention, the county could
not lawfully impose the condition of a county address on General
Assistance applicants because such a requirement was arbitrary
and capricious and thus beyond the authority vested in the board
of supervisors.57 The court of appeals disagreed, however, and
held that the requirement of a county address was within the discretion of the board of supervisors."
The court stated that:
Neither arbitrary nor capricious conduct (nor fraud) can reasonably be inferred from the pleaded requirement that immediate general relief is available "only after the needy person has an address which can be given to the welfare department as his place of residence". Such a requirement is obviously reasonable. A county disbursing relief under the
direction of section 17000 is fairly entitled to some objective
criteria to determine whether an applicant is truly a resident
of the county. One in Adkins' position could otherwise collect his general relief and then pass on, perhaps to repeat
his demand in another county. And in such cases the requirement of section 17006.

.

.that an applicant for general

relief be investigated would obviously be frustrated by payment before investigation to one with no county address. 59
The court thus concluded that the county's address requirement
was a legitimate prerequisite to General Assistance under the
county's express powers to administer the General Assistance program, to require residency, and to investigate all applications for
relief."
The Authority to Set Levels of General Assistance. Another power expressly delegated to the county boards is the power
of supervisors to adopt standards of aid and care for general
as54. Id.

55. The relief actually was asked for in the form of an "order prohibiting"
and an "order compelling"; however, were this relief granted, it would have
taken the form of a writ of mandate or an injunction. Id. at 771, 95 Cal. Rptr.
at 61.
56. Id. at 774, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
57. Id. at 778-79, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
58. Id.

59. Id. at 779, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
60. Id.
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sistance recipients. 61 This power is set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 17001 which provides that:
The board of supervisors of each county, or the agency authorized by the county charter, shall adopt standards of aid and
care for the indigent
and dependent poor of the county or
62
city and county.
As the statute indicates, the local boards of supervisors have the
discretion to set the amount of assistance that will be granted to
persons eligible for such aid. 63 This discretionary authority has
resulted in a wide discrepency among the general assistance rates,
as indicated by the following table.

County

Alameda
Alpine
Amador
Butte
Calaveras
Colusa
Contra Costa
Del Norte
El Dorado
Fresno
Glenn
Humboldt
Imperial
Inyo
Kern
Kings
Lake
Lassen
Los Angeles
Madera
Main
Mariposa
Mendocino
Merced
Modoc
Mono
Monterey
Napa
Nevada
61. CAL.
62. Id.
63. Id.

64.

Table 264
Family Cases
Cases
Average
Grant
per month
102
97.94
0
0
0
0
7
97.71
0
0
0
0
184
100.73
0
0
35
38.23
67
24.61
0
0
62
66.21
9
31.89
4
28.00
10
127.40
5
19.20
1
10.00
0
0
11
163.82
0
0
10
46.60
1
35.00
2
9.00
33
86.45
15
14.33
0
0
76
38.05
0
0
0
0

WELF & INST'NS. CODE §

One Person Cases
Average
Cases
Grant
per month
76.17
3527
0
0
20.00
1
63.55
76
3
25.00
0
0
1814
67.11
0
0
102
48.95
124
48.63
0
0
98
75.57
42
41.07
55.30
10
189
57.24
54.35
31
40.50
2
0
0
19,918
75.35
12
27.67
100.71
146
1
58.00
32
49.84
104
68.43
16
12.50
0
0
128
62.56
3
67.33
3
48.33

17001 (West 1972).

PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA, JUNE

1972, supra note 1, table 10a.
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61.92
28.23
240
210
Orange
9
26.44
12.50
4
Placer
8
43.62
25.00
1
Plumas
57.68
48.13
240
54
Riverside
78.24
77.30
4342
360
Sacramento
4
44.75
0
0
San Benito
82.33
185
7
58.71
San Bernardino
83.57
108.02
2610
120
San Diego
73.84
6130
74.93
201
San Francisco
36.67
55.61
108
23
San Joaquin
50.51
47.98
69
67
San Luis Obispo
109.36
113.80
1771
128
San Mateo
53.11
410
66.25
24
Santa Barbara
106.46
4130
268
167.32
Santa Clara
64.88
161
9
73.56
Santa Cruz
35.29
31
7
30.42
Shasta
0
0
0
0
Sierra
61.75
16
5.00
1
Siskiyou
86.92
195
18
129.28
Solano
41.66
186
36
35.25
Sonoma
58.11
209
72.69
29
Stanislaus
0
0
0
0
Sutter
41.00
1
3
9.33
Tehama
0
0
1
35.00
Trinity
67.77
188.33
112
3
Tulare
86.00
11
35.00
1
Tuolumne
88.10
177
18
97.61
Ventura
65.25
59
3
74.00
Yolo
41.95
37
8
44.12
Yuba
It is clear that there is a wide discrepancy in the general assistance rates from county to county. The central valley county
of Tulare, for example, pays an average of $188.33 per month
for a family of two or more, while the neighboring valley counties, Fresno and Kings, pay an average of $24.61 and $19.20
respectively for a family of two or more." Similarly, the southern
California county of San Diego pays $108.02 for a family of
two or more, while neighboring counties Imperial and Riverside
pay an average of $31.89 and $48.13 respectively for a similar
family."6
The problem of wide variations in General Assistance rates
which the statute authorizes is to a certain extent compounded by
court cases which condone extensive board discretion in the setting
of welfare rates.67 Consequently, individuals who are dependent
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217
(1951); County of Los Angeles v. Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d
455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953); Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231,
94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971); Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr.
61 (1971); Bums v. Gillette, No. 275048, Santa Clara County Superior Court,
July 7, 1972.
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on the county are left in some counties with wholly inadequate
resources with which to meet their needs.6 8 A typical example
of a court case condoning the use of broad discretion is Patten v.
County of San Diego.69 The plaintiff had been a recipient of Genral Assistance under the San Diego County General Assistance program for some time before the county discovered his failure to report the fact that he had received certain sums of money from his
sister."r Based on the failure to report income, the county discontinued Patten's aid and he sued to compel the county to restore his welfare payments. 7 ' The court ruled that his aid should
be restored in the amount to which he was entitled and subject
to certain conditions." z Thereafter, the plaintiff moved to have
the judgment modified to compel the county to pay him the sum
of $157 with which to repay money advanced to him by third parties during the litigation. 7 3 The court refused to grant such relief,
holding that they had no authority to determine the amount of
the payments to be made by the county.74 The court stated that:
The administration of County General Relief given pursuant
to section 2500 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (now section 17000) is vested in the county boards of supervisors. The
Welfare and Institutions Code does not require that the county
grant indigents any specific type of relief nor does it require
the payment of any specific amount of money to indigents nor
prescribe the time at which payments are to be made. These
matters are within the discretion of the boards of supervisors and the court has no authority to interfere with administrative determinations of a board of supervisors with respect
to the granting of county general relief in the absence of a
clear showing of fraud or arbitrary or capricious conduct. 75
68. Id.
69. 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217 (1951).
70. Id. at 469, 235 P.2d at 218.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 469, 235 P.2d at 218-19. The opinion of the court does not
specify what those conditions were.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 470, 235 P.2d at 219.
75. Id.: The Patten court rested its decision on the California Supreme
Court case of Bila v. Young, 20 Cal. 2d 865, 129 P.2d 364 (1942). In that
case the plaintiff was denied Old Age Assistance under a state statute providing for such a denial if the applicant or recipient transferred property without
adequate consideration. The trial court held that the action of the Social Welfare Board in denying plaintiff aid was based on a mistaken interpretation of
the statute, and entered an order requiring the Social Welfare Board to pay the
plaintiff aid in the amount of $40 per month. On appeal, the California
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's construction of the statute, but refused to
enforce that part of the order requiring the payment of $40 per month. The
court stated that "since the administration of this statute is conferred upon local
boards of supervisors and the respondent Social Welfare Board, the trial court
had no power to determine the amount of payment or the date at which such

payment should be made." 20 Cal. 2d 865, 869-70, 129 P.2d 364, 367.
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Similarly, in County of Los Angeles v. Department of Social Welfare,76 eleven persons who were recipients of Old Age
Assistance and Aid to the Blind complained to the- State Social
Welfare Board that Los Angeles County, in determining the appropriate amount of General Assistance for their husbands and
wives, was improperly treating their categorical aid as family income.7 7 The State Welfare Board ruled that this practice was illegal and ordered that state and federal funds be withheld from
the county because of this procedure.7" The California Supreme
Court however, overruled the State Welfare Board and allowed the
county to continue treating categorical aid as family income for
purposes of determining General Assistance aid. 79 The court stated
that:
No federal or state funds are granted for this purpose [general assistance relief] and the counties are not required to
grant any specific type of relief or to pay any specific amount
of money. The administration of county relief to indigents, as
distinguished from old age security and needy blind assistance, is vested exclusively in the county supervisors who have
discretion without supervision by the state, to determine eligibility for, the type and amount of, and conditions to be attached to indigent relief.80
The grant of broad discretionary authority by section
1700181 has met with wide acceptance in recent decisions.8 2 In
Mooney v. Pickett,8 3 the Supreme Court stated that "we have interpreted this provision [section 17001] to confer upon the county
a broad discretion to determine eligibility for, the type and amount
of, and conditions to be attached to indigent relief."8 4 Furthermore, in Adkins v. Leach,8 5 the court quoted at length fom Patten v. County of San Diego86 and County of Los Angeles v. Department of Social Welfare87 to hold that the local county boards
of supervisors are vested with broad discretion to set the levels
of general assistance payments to eligible indigents.8 8
76. 41 Cal. 2d 455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953).
77. Id. at 456, 260 P.2d at 42.
78. Id. at 457, 260 P.2d at 42-43. The opinion does not specify the reasons why the Social Welfare Board so held.
79. Id. at 459, 260 P.2d at 44.
80. Id. at 458, 260 P.2d at 43.
81. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 17001 (West 1972).
82. Mooney v. Pickett, 6 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279
(1971); Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
83. 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
84. Id. at 679, 483 P.2d at 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
85. 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
86. 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217 (1951).
87. 41 Cal. 2d 455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953).
88. 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 778-79, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61, 65-66.

1972]

CALIFORNIA

WELFARE RATES

County boards of supervisors are judicially limited only by
that in setting these rates, they must not act arbitrarily,
rule
the
capriciously or fraudulently. 9 In effect then, counties are required to support all their eligible indigents, 90 but may determine
on any reasonable basis what that level of support should be. 91
In the exercise of this discretion many counties have seen fit to
grant insufficient aid to indigents.92 No extensive surveys are
needed to show that the cost of food, clothing, shelter and

other essential items for families of two or more greatly exceeds
the levels of aid paid by some counties, as shown in Table 2.

An indigent family of two or more can hardly live on such nominal amounts.
The Definition of Support: Burns v. Gillette.5 The previously discussed cases of Patten v. County of San Diego, 4
County of Los Angeles v. Department of Social Welfare,9 5 and
Mooney v. Pickett"0 dealt with the power and duty of county
boards to provide support. None attempted to define support or
set standards for measuring the sufficiency of support.9 7 This
issue was not squarely met until the recent Santa Clara County
case of Burns v. Gillette.9 8 Burns arose out of the following
facts: in late spring of 1972, the Santa Clara County Board of
Supervisors was considering their budget for the fiscal year 19721973. At a meeting on May 23, 1972, the board considered a
recommendation from the County Executive's office that the
board reduce the current General Assistance rates.99 At the time
of the recommendation, Santa Clara County allowed a maximum
of $136 for single persons and an indefinite maximum for fain89. Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217
(1951); Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
90. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 17000 (West 1972).
91. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 17001 (West 1972); Patten v. County of
San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217 (1951); Adkins v. Leach, 17
Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971); Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d
669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
92. See table 2 supra.
93. No. 275048, Santa Clara County Superior Court, July 7, 1972.
94. 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217 (1951).
95. 41 Cal. 2d 455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953).
96. 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
97. See Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217
(1951); County of Los Angeles v. Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d 455,
260 P.2d 41 (1953); Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 279 (1971); Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1971).
98. No. 275048, Santa Clara County Superior Court, July 7, 1972.
99. Affidavit of Charles A. Quinn, Chairman, Santa Clara County Board of
Supervisors, Burns v. Gillette, No. 275048, Santa Clara County Superior Court,
July 7, 1972.
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ilies, depending on the number of individuals in the family
units.'l°
The average grant for a single person was $106.46,
and for families, $167.32.101
The County Executive recommended a reduction in the current rates of approximately 33% 102
which would have brought the welfare levels to an average of $80
to $85 dollars for a single person, and about $135 for an average
family of two or more. The recommendation was considered and
set aside for two weeks to enable the County Executive to obtain the views of the County Welfare Department regarding his
recommendation and other related issues.' 08 Several days after
the recommendation, the welfare department called a meeting of
officers from the County Executive's office to consider the merits
of the recommendation. 1 4 The meeting was held on May 31,
1972, and the individuals attending the meeting concerned themselves primarily with the problem of reducing the welfare rates
for so-called "employable persons" while leaving the current rates
for aged or incapacitated "unemployable" persons intact. The
actual amount of the proposed rate reduction was passed over
and approved without any reference to statistical data or standards with respect to the cost of living or the cost of basic essentials
(i.e. food, shelter, medical care, etc.) in Santa Clara County or
in any other county. 0 5 The officials attending the meeting eventually decided to recommend to the board of supervisors that
General Assistance for employable individuals be reduced approximately 33%; while leaving the levels of assistance for nonemployables unchanged.' 0
On June 7, 1972, the board of supervisors met, and the recommendation to reduce the rates for employable persons was discussed and approved, again without reference to statistical data showing whether the reduced rates would
be sufficient to meet the needs of employable welfare recipients." 7
At the close of the discussion, the board adopted the following
standards, effective as of July 1, 1972:108
100. Id.
101. PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA, JUNE 1972, supra note 1, table 10a.
102. Affidavit of Charles A. Quinn, Chairman, Santa Clara County Board
of Supervisors, Burns v. Gillette, No. 275048, Santa Clara County Superior
Court, July 7, 1972.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. No minutes or record of this meeting were kept.
106. Deposition of Fredrick B. Gillette, Director, Santa Clara County Department of Social Services, Burns v. Gillette, No. 275048, Santa Clara County
Superior Court, July 7, 1972.
107. Id.
108. Affidavit of Charles A. Quinn, Chairman, Santa Clara County Board of
Supervisors, Burns v. Gillette, No. 275048, Santa Clara County Superior Court,
July 7, 1972.
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Number of persons
in budget unit
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Maximum for
employables
$100.00
166.00
205.00
245.00
279.00
314.00
344.00
375.00
405.00
435.00

Maximum for
non-employables
$136.00
192.00
231.00
271.00
305.00
340.00
374.00
409.00
443.00
477.00109

Shortly after the decision of the board, a class action was filed
on behalf of Donald Burns, Mary Motely, Roy Rowe, and all
other similarly situated "employable" General Assistance recipients
who were about to have their grants reduced in accordance with
the June 7 resolution of the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. 110 The complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief relied on three separate theories: first, that by adopting a 33 %
reduction in the level of general assistance aid, the county was
failing to meet its statutory duty of support under Welfare and
Institutions Code sections 17000 and 17001; 111 second, that by
failing to refer to or rely on any statistical data in determining
whether the new rates were adequate to "support" an employable
General Assistance recipient, the county board of supervisors acted
arbitrarily and capriciously denying to the plaintiffs their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law under the California Constitution; 1 2 and third, for the same reasons plaintiffs
were denied due process under the United States Constitution.- 3
The case was tried on July 7, 1972, and the board of supervisors decision to reduce the rates was upheld.11 4 At the trial,
several officers from the County Executive's office and the welfare
department testified that they had each attended the meeting where
the decision to reduce the rates originated. They each testified
that they did not refer to or rely on any statistical data in determining whether the rates recommended were adequate to meet
the minimum cost of living in Santa Clara County. The director
of the welfare department testified, however, that the cost of living in Santa Clara County was common knowledge, not only to
him, but also to the many other people who attended the meet109. Id.

110. Plaintiff's Complaint, Bums v. Gillette, No. 275048, Santa Clam
County Superior Court, July 7, 1972.
111. Id., 1-7.
112. Id., 7-9; see CAL. CONST. art. I § 13.
113. Id., 9; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
114. Judgment, 1-2, Bums v. Gillette, No. 275048, Santa Clara County Superior Court, July 7, 1972.
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ing, and that therefore it was unnecessary to refer to any statistical data in evaluating these costs. After considering this testimony, the trial judge held that the county board had not acted
arbitrarily or capriciously and thus had not exceeded their discretion when they reduced the levels of General Assistance for employable persons. In his holding, the trial judge quoted from
Mooney v. Pickett,' 5' discussed supra, saying that:
We are aware of the financial difficulties which attend present welfare programs on local, state, and national levels. This
court, however, is not fitted to write a new welfare law for the
State of California, and while the Legislature addresses itself
to that task it remains our task to enforce the existing law.
We observe that the county retains extensive authority to establish standards for General Assistance, both as to eligibility
and as to amount of aid. In view of this discretion, the county
can surely find many ways which do not violate state statutes in which it can limit General Assistance to the financial
resources available. 110
The court concluded that the county could legally lower its
General Assistance welfare rates without referring to any statistical data or criteria to determine whether the reduced levels of
assistance were adequate to "support" the individuals dependent
upon the county.
The decision of the trial judge, though unfortunate, was
obviously correct in light of the cases dealing with the discretion
of the county boards in this area. 11 The judge could not properly overturn the decision of the board of supervisors unless their
action constituted arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent conduct." 8
The unrefuted bare assertion that the welfare director and others
were "familiar" with the minimum cost of living in Santa Clara
County and had made their recommendation based on their expertise was insufficient to convince the court that the board of supervisors had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or fraudulently.
The Burns case squarely presented the problem of defining
"support" as the term is used in Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000,11 and how that level of support should be determined. The plaintiffs contended that the appropriate level of sup115. Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
116. Id. at 680, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
117. See Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217
(1951); County of Los Angeles v. Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d 455,
260 P.2d 41 (1953); Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 279 (1971); Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1971).
118. Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217
(1951); Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
119. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 17000 (West 1972).
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port should be determined in light of the cost of living standards
within the county. The court disagreed, however, apparently
feeling that the county welfare department's recommendation to
reduce support rates was reliable in view of the welfare department's familiarity with the cost of living in the county. Since
the term "support" as used in Welfare and Institutions Code section
17000 is not defined in the statute, the county boards of supervisors are permitted to compute support payments by any reasonable means.'
Such means should properly include the recommendation of the county welfare department, since its director
and his staff are considered experts in the field of welfare. Other
reasonable means might include cost of living statistics, as the
plaintiffs in JBurns urged, as well as information regarding local housing costs, general food prices, the availability of Medi-Cal,
and a host of similar factors. Such broad criteria, however,
leave the board of supervisors free to base their General Assistance
rates on any factor or combination of factors pleasing to them.
This discretionary authority produces inconsistent welfare rates
from county to county, as demonstrated by Table 2, supra. 2 '
Consequently, some counties meet their statutory duty of support
to those who 22are dependent on welfare, while other counties patently do not.

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

Two solutions might redress the imbalance in General Assistance rates: the first is a court action in mandamus to compel the respective boards of supervisors to "support" the county's
indigents; the second is corrective legislation which would establish definite guidelines delineating and defining the duty of "support".
Mandamus
According to section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an
action in mandamus will lie
. . . to compel the performance of an act which the law
specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust,

or station .... 123
This provision has been interpreted to allow an action in mandamus to be brought against a county board of supervisors to
compel the performance of a duty.' 2 4 The relief in such an ac120. See Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971)
for the general "reasonableness" limitation.
121. See also PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA, JUNE 1972, supra note 1, table 10a.
122. Id.
123. CAL. ClV. PRo. CODE § 1085 (West 1955).
124. Geiger v. Board of Supervisors of Butte County, 48 Cal. 2d 839, 313
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tion, however, is extremely limited-especially when dealing with
a discretionary act of the board of supervisors, such as establishing of county welfare rates.125 Thus, in Patten v. County of
San Diego,1 26 discussed supra, an action in mandamus was instituted in the form of a motion to modify the judgment in order to
compel the county to pay $157 to the plaintiff. 127 After ruling that the matter of county General Assistance levels was an
area left by the Welfare and Institutions Code to the local boards
of supervisors, 128 the court held that:

Mandamus may not compel the exercise of such discretion in any particular manner. It may only direct that the
officer act, and must leave that
matter as to what action he
1 29
will take to his determination.

Similarly, in Berger v. Justice8 0 the plaintiffs brought an action in mandamus to compel the board of supervisors to consider
their motion to establish a new county rate for irrigation water delivered to them. The court denied relief, holding that the power to
set rates for irrigation water was a discretionary power vested in
the board of supervisors, and that the court had no power to compel them to change the rate, citing Code of Civil Procedure sec131
tion 1085 as support for this conclusion.
In light of Patten v. County of San Diego'8 2 and Berger v.

Justice 3 3 the utility of mandamus to solve the problem of insufficient county welfare rates is highly doubtful. As demonstrated
by the Patten'14 case, the court is powerless to establish adequate
levels of support itself.' 5 It can only compel the exercise of discretion by the board of supervisors, and the board's exercise of
that discretion will prevail unless found to be arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent. 6 Under this standard of review, a court
might be justified in overturning a rate of five or ten dollars per
month for a family of two.'3

7

But would a court do so were it

P.2d 545 (1957); McCafferty v. Board of Supervisors of Placer County, 3
Cal. App. 3d 190, 83 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1969).

125. Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217;
(1951); Berger v. Justice, 4 Cal. App. 532, 88 P. 591 (1906).
126. 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217 (1951).

127. Id. at 469, 235 P.2d at 218-219.
128. Id. at 470, 235 P.2d at 219.
129. Id.
130. 4 Cal. App. 532, 88 P. 591 (1906).
131. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1096.5 (West 1955) governing
mandamus actions against administrative bodies.
132. 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217 (1951).
133. 4 Cal. App. 532, 88 P. 591 (1906).
134. Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217
(1951).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See table 2, supra; such counties as Placer, Tehama, Siskiyou, Lake,
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faced with a forty or fifty dollar a month level? 3 8 The courts
may look with raised eyebrows on the individual welfare rates of
some counties, but their authority to review the adequacy of the
rates is strictly limited. 1 39 Consequently it is doubtful whether
a court action in mandamus would resolve the wide discrepencies among county welfare rates.
CorrectiveLegislation
This discrepency in welfare rates can properly be rectified
only through legislative amendments establishing definite guidelines delineating and defining "support". 140
Such legislation
would eliminate the problem of inadequate levels of support in
some counties. Consequently, those indigents who rely on the
county for their livelihood would at least have sufficient funds to
meet the minimum costs of living.
An amendment along these lines might take the form of a
statute repealing section 17001 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code and replacing it with a code section setting forth uniform
levels of support throughout the state. Such a statute would eliminate the wide discrepency now existing among the various counties, and insure that all indigents dependent upon the county for
support would have available the minimum funds necessary to
meet the statewide minimum cost of living. A statute along these
lines should declare that when any county undertakes to support
an eligible indigent, relief must be provided according to a fixed
schedule setting forth levels of support based on minimum costs
of living standards within the state. In order to promote further uniformity, the statute might fix these levels at amounts
identical to those established for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children category.' 4 ' These levels of assistance are as follows:
Mendocino, and Modoc all pay under $15 per month for a family of two or
more.
138. Id.
139. Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217
(1951).
140. In addition to the problem of the strict standard of review, the idea of

court action seems impracticable. Initially, it would take a vast number of suits,
one in each county, to acquire adequate relief. In the alternative, a state wide
suit might be attempted, but the inconvenience to the respective county administrations might result in many inconveniences to witnesses, see CAL. Civ. PRO.
CODE § 397 (West 1955).
Furthermore, at least one plaintiff from each
county would be required under CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 1086 (West 1955)
requiring a plaintiff to be beneficially interested in the outcome of the litigation
in order to have standing to sue for a writ of mandate, see Patten v. City of Port
Huaneme, 102 Cal. App. 2d 141, 227 P.2d 25 (1951).
141. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS. CODE § 11450 (West 1972).
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Persons in
budget unit

Maximum amount
of assistance
per month

1
2
3
4
5
6

$115
190
235
280
320
360

7

395

8
9

430
465

10 or more

500142

Under these proposed standards, general assistance recipients would have sufficient funds to carry on decent and healthful
lives. Furthermore, they would have enough money for adequate clothing and transportation and thus be able to actively
seek employment and eventually become self-supporting.
As an alternative solution to the problem, it is possible that
the legislature would recognize the differences in the cost of living
among the various counties and provide that the county set the
levels of support according to these differences. To alleviate
the situation presented by the Burns141 case, however, the stat-

ute should provide that when the county seeks to determine the
level of support to be paid, the board of supervisors must refer to
and rely on minimum cost of living statistics that have been based
on local surveys. This alternative might be more desirable than
having uniform rates throughout the state in light of the fact that
the minimum cost of living can vary from one county to the next.
Furthermore, the taxpayers in the counties where the minimum
cost of living is lower than the normal would not needlessly pay
higher taxes. To accomplish this, Welfare and Institutions Code
section 17001 should be amended to set forth the criteria to be
relied on by the county boards of supervisors in determining their
respective levels of General Assistance. Such criteria might be similar to the guidelines used in the Aid to Families With Dependent
Children category which are set forth in Welfare and Institutions
Code section 11452:14
(1) Safe, healthful housing.
(2) Minimum clothing for health and decency.
(3) Low-cost adequate food budget meeting recommended dietary allowances of the National Research Council.
(4) Utilities.
(5) Other items including household operation, educa142. Id.
143. Burns v. Gillette, No. 275048, Santa Clara County Superior Court, July
7, 1972.
144. CA.. WELF. & INS'VNS. CODE § 11452 (West 1972).
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tion and incidentals, recreation, personal needs and insurance.
(6) Allowance for essential medical, dental, or other remedial care to the extent not otherwise provided at public expense.
(7) Other recurring special needs.
The determination of the cost of these items shall be
made through reliance on factual surveys and data which
show the cost of these items within the county.
CONCLUSIONS

From the preceding discussion of the varying levels of general assistance within the state, it can readily be seen that some
counties are failing to meet their statutory obligation of support as
required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000. This
unfortunate consequence results from the broad discretion vested
in local boards of supervisors to set such levels of support. As
demonstrated by the cases of Patten v. County of San Diego,1'"
County of Los Angeles v. Department of Social Welfare,140 and
Mooney v. Pickett, 4 7 the board of supervisors discretion to fix such
levels of support is limited only by the rule that the board must
not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or fraudulently. Consequently,
many counties have taken advantage of this rule to the point of
rendering their county's General Assistance program useless: a
level of five or ten dollars per month for a family of two or more
persons1 48 is patently insufficient. The dependent poor who are
subjected to this program have no recourse except to move to another county. This dilemma can only be effectively corrected
through legislation requiring uniform standards of aid throughout
the state, or in the alternative, by legislation requiring the county
to conform its General Assistance levels to the minimum costs of
living within the county. Thereby, the indigents dependent upon
county aid would be provided with sufficient funds to carry on
1 49
decent and healthful lives.
James P. Wagoner*
145.

106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217 (1951).

146. 41 Cal. 2d 455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953).
147. 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).

148. See PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA, JUNE 1972, supra note 1, table 10a.
149. For the equal protection aspects of this problem, see Horwitz and Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public

Assistance Programs from Place to Place within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
787, 812-15 (1968).

* The author wishes to express his thanks to Mr. Bob Saxe, Deputy
County Counsel and attorney for the county in the Burns case, and Mr. Fredrick B. Gillette, Director of the Santa Clara County Department of Social Welfare and defendant in the Burns case for their assistance in the preparation of

this comment.

